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It’s a peculiar apparatus.1 
 
This issue of the UC Irvine Law Review contains nine articles based on papers 
originally presented at the third “Law As . . .” conference, held March 7–9, 2014, at 
the University of California, Irvine School of Law. Collectively, the articles comprise 
a further deposit in a bank of scholarship and commentary begun at the inaugural 
“Law As . . .” conference held in April 20102 and continued at the second 
conference held two years later in March 2012.3 
Although each of the three conferences, and resulting collections of articles, 
has its own character, on each occasion the intent has been to engage in a double 
move: to deploy history as an interpretive practice—a theory, a methodology, a 
philosophy—with which to engage law; and simultaneously to offer history as a 
substantive arena in which other interpretive practices from across the broad 
spectrum of the humanities and social sciences can undertake their own engagement 
with law. The result has been a work in progress that has arced in the direction of 
situating “Law As . . .” in the realm of jurisprudence. That tendency is rendered 
explicit in this issue. 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
1. FRANZ KAFKA, IN THE PENAL COLONY 5 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., The Ltd. 
Editions Club 1987) (1935). 
2. Symposium, Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law As . . .”: Theory and 
Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519 (2011). 
3. Symposium, “Law As . . .” II, History As Interface for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law, 4 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2014). 
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I. MINOR JURISPRUDENCE 
The first “Law As . . .” conference addressed itself quite squarely to the field 
of intellectual endeavor known as legal history. The conference was premised on an 
asserted necessity that legal historians reconsider their default participation in the 
theory and practice of “law and.” Grounded on the early twentieth-century 
distinction between “law in the books” and “law in action,” honed by legal realism, 
and generalized by the law and society movement, “law and” explains law as a 
domain of activity by parsing its interactions with cognate but distinct domains of 
activity (society, polity, economy, culture, and so forth) that furnish law with an 
exterior context. Legal history conceived in accordance with this approach attempts 
to reveal the effect of law, or to explain the reality of law, by assessing change over 
time in law vis-à-vis the contextualizing domains (society, polity, economy, and 
culture) from which it is held relationally distinct.4 The objective of the first 
conference was to force legal history out of this mainstream sociolegal comfort zone 
by proposing, first, that historical explanations of law “are not to be found, either 
necessarily or sufficiently, in its relations to other things,”5 that rather than parse 
relations “between distinct domains of activity, between law and what lies ‘outside’ 
of it, the objective of historical research about law might be to imagine them as the 
same domain”;6 and second, that legal historians refine their own interpretive 
practice by interacting much more extensively with scholars engaged in distinctively 
interdisciplinary projects throughout the realm of legal studies. Invited to dispense 
with theory built from the “law and” conjunction, sixteen authors responded by 
“conceptualiz[ing] law variously as text, peace, politics, silence, claims, justice, 
consciousness, resistance and that which is resisted, drama, tragedy, enchantment, 
sacred ritual, spectacle, allegory, war, empire, the Crown, money, economy, and 
more.”7 
The second conference underscored the twinned elements at the center of the 
“Law As . . .” enterprise, and the synergies existing between them. The first element, 
of course, is history, its task clarified by the first conference as the identification of 
that which conceals in order to open up to discovery that which is concealed. 
Nothing is more concealing than legality, the magical power to measure and 
define—to constitute—that makes so much, including itself, disappear.8 The 
 
4. Id. at 1–2; Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in Legal 
History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1040–41 (2011). 
5. Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 4, at 1041. 
6. Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal 
History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 523–24 (2011). 
7. Id. at 524. 
8. Id. at 538 (“The magical power of law is to make the state and its exercises of power—
sometimes coercive, sometimes liberatory—disappear. The violence of the law, as Robert Cover said, 
disappears when law makes its operations seem to be the product of consent, custom, contract, or 
civilization. The law accomplishes its own vanishing when it makes the movement of money, land, or 
other resources seem to be the product of putatively autonomous institutions like the market, the 
employment contract, or the family.” (citation omitted)); see also Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 4, at 
1078. 
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second element is the “concealed” substrate opened by historical inquiry to the 
interpretive play of a multiplicity of intellectual practices. In the eighteen papers 
presented at the second conference, plural modes of historical inquiry were to be 
found in intimate dialog with sociologies, anthropologies, and multiple forms of 
critical literary, political, and legal theory. 
Most exciting at the second conference was the appearance of a tendency 
toward exploration of the constellations that historical inquiry can create between 
past and present. This tendency identifies the “Law As . . .” enterprise as one that 
can generate practical knowledge for the here-and-now, “the moment, it might be 
said, when the origins of the present ‘jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence,’ 
spirit into experience, metaphysics into materiality.”9 As this suggests, a key 
outcome of the second conference was the clear possibility that “Law As . . .” could 
become a kind of jurisprudence.10 
But what kind of a jurisprudence? The answer to that question lies within the 
articles comprising this collection.11 Clearly, the jurisprudence they canvas is not of 
a piece with what Peter Goodrich has termed “sovereign or major jurisprudence,”12 
the kind of jurisprudence that would have us understand law holistically, “as being 
all one thing or all another,”13 the kind that represents the legal order, in Panu 
Minkkinen’s words, “as a system”: “a relational structure formalized from normative 
phenomena and stratified within a framework of hierarchical rationality.”14 The 
jurisprudence we encounter here, rather, is a “minor” jurisprudence. 
Minor jurisprudence comes to us principally in two registers. The leading 
register is that associated with Goodrich, for whom “minor jurisprudence” 
describes any species of legal knowledge that has escaped “the phantom of a 
sovereign and unitary law.”15 The product of “rebels, critics, marginals, aliens, 
 
9. Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 4, at 1044. 
10. Christopher Tomlins, Foreword: “Law As . . .” II, History As Interface for the Interdisciplinary Study 
of Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 18 (2014). On jurisprudence as practical thinking, see PANU 
MINKKINEN, THINKING WITHOUT DESIRE: A FIRST PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3, 34, 97 (1999). 
11. Of the eleven papers presented at the third conference, nine appear in this collection. Two 
of the participants—Shaun McVeigh and Annelise Riles—were prevented by professional and personal 
circumstances from revising their papers for inclusion here. It is a pleasure, however, to welcome the 
presence here of Shaun McVeigh as collaborator on the “Afterword” to this collection. Others 
participating in the conference as commentators were: Nahum Chandler, Justin Desautels-Stein, Sora 
Han, Jeffrey Helmreich, Michelle McKinley, Bill Maurer, Renisa Mawani, Michael Meranze, Kunal 
Parker, Brook Thomas, and Christopher Tomlins. Shaun McVeigh delivered an impromptu 
ventriloquization of Bill MacNeil, who was prevented from attending the conference by urgent family 
circumstances. 
12. PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR 
JURISPRUDENCES 4 (1996). 
13. Fisk & Gordon, supra note 6, at 525. 
14. Panu Minkkinen, The Radiance of Justice: On the Minor Jurisprudence of Franz Kafka, 3 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 349, 350 (1994) (emphasis added). 
15. GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 2. 
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women and outsiders,”16 in this register “minor jurisprudence” is simultaneously 
plural, subaltern, and subversive. 
A minor jurisprudence is one which neither aspires nor pretends to be the 
only law or universal jurisprudence. Its referent is a law whose jurisdiction 
is neither jealous of other jurisdictions nor fearful of alternative disciplines. 
It represents the strangeness of language and so the possibilities of 
interpretation as also of plural forms of knowledge. A minor 
jurisprudence . . . is a challenge to the science of law and a threat to its 
monopoly of legal knowledge.17 
Precisely because minor jurisprudences “challenge[ ] the law of masters, the 
genre and categories of the established institution of doctrine and its artificial and 
paper rules,” their history is tragic, even nightmarish—a history of marginality and 
effacement, “of repressed, forgotten and failed jurisdictions,” of knowledge and 
practices “denied or ignored,” “discarded or failed,” “repressed or absorbed” by 
“the phantasm of an all-powerful law.”18 Minor jurisprudences are legion, but they 
are also fleeting. Their existence is unsettling to “the monistic imagination and the 
unifying logic” of “the procedures and the norms of positive law”19—hence, their 
fate is co-optation or repression. The task of history is to recall minor jurisprudences 
from oblivion so that they can interrupt those who occupy “the seats of legal 
power.”20 It is to destabilize, break into, and transgress the “modernist project of 
legality”—closed and predetermined—by counterposing to it “the contingencies 
and heterogeneities of different jurisdictions and alternative forms of law.”21 
Minor jurisprudence in this register is disruptive, its position vis-à-vis law 
external and antagonistic, its historicality deeply antifoundational. In all these senses 
it is of a piece with the historicism that has come to characterize the encounter 
between history and law, that identifies history above all as a contextualizing 
practice and fetishizes thick description, contingency, and complexity.22 Like 
historicism, minor jurisprudence in this register is synonymous with critique. It 
begins and ends with critique. But minor jurisprudence also exists in a second 
register, in which it is—at least in essence—something rather more than only critical 
and antifoundational, and hence has more to offer history as practice than 
historicism. Minor jurisprudence in this register is associated with Panu Minkkinen 
and expressed most notably in his interpretation of Franz Kafka’s novella In der 
 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 2–3. 
19. Id. at 4. 
20. Id. at 5. 
21. Id. at 4, 7. 
22. See, for example, Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); 
Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (1997). For a 
response, see Christopher Tomlins, After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. 
SCI. 31 (2012); and Christopher Tomlins, What is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique? Revisiting 
Gordon’s “Critical Legal Histories,” 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 155 (2012). 
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Strafkolonie (In the Penal Colony).23 Kafka, says Minkkinen, stands outside all major 
literary traditions, and cannot be read in their terms (as “self-evident proponent of 
a ‘negative theology’ of modernity,” as visionary chronicler “of the painful destiny 
of modern man”); he is the initiator of a new “minor literature” and hence of a new 
politics.24 So also, Kafka stands outside any and all major jurisprudential traditions; 
he should be read as the initiator of a new “minor legal literature” or “minor 
jurisprudence” that is “a generalization of the world of law, a political statement 
about law” which can be “the foundation of a new law.”25 Quite forcefully, 
Minkkinnen distinguishes the quality of foundational innovation in Kafka’s minor 
jurisprudence from antifoundationalism’s commitment to incessant critique: 
The danger lies in the interpretative naïveté affecting most political 
readings of Kafka’s minor jurisprudence. “In der Strafkolonie” is read as if 
the text represented a form of literary justice that e contrario condemns the 
forceful functioning of law in modernity. By unveiling the violent nature 
of legal power in modern society and the inability of modern jurisprudence 
to assume responsibility for it, it is claimed that, in his literature, Kafka sets 
a normative standard for moral and ethical reform within the traditional 
notions of social justice.26 
 
23. See Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 352, 358; see also MINKKINEN, supra note 10, at 150–64 
(reproducing the original version of Minkkinen’s article with minor revisions). Minkkinen appears to 
have been the first scholar to use the term “minor jurisprudence,” which appears in his 1994 article. 
Publication of Law in the Courts of Love two years later firmly associated the term with Goodrich, from 
whose usage, however, Minkkinen demurs. “According to Goodrich, a ‘minor jurisprudence’ escapes 
the phantom of a sovereign law by challenging ‘the law of masters’ and the science that embraces it. I 
find this formulation . . . too much of a ‘critical oeuvre’ of its author[.]” MINKKINEN, supra note 10, at 
159 n.28. Minkkinen’s contrasting conception of minor jurisprudence is less developed than 
Goodrich’s, and as a result has not been as influential. But see William P. MacNeil, From Rites to Realities 
(And Back Again): The Spectacle of Human Rights in The Hunger Games, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 483 (2015). 
24. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 357 (citing GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, KAFKA: 
POUR UNE LITTÉRATURE MINEURE [TOWARD A MINOR LITERATURE] (1975) (Fr.)). For details of the 
English translation, see infra note 25. 
25. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 357, 358 (emphasis added). In her foreword to the English 
translation of DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 24, Réda Bensmaïa observes that by mobilizing the 
concept of “minor literature,” Deleuze and Guattari enable the reader “to enter into Kafka’s work 
without being weighted down by the old categories of genres, types, modes, and style” that “imply that 
the reader’s task is at bottom to interpret Kafka’s writing.” Réda Bensmaïa, Foreword: The Kafka Effect 
(Terry Cochran trans.), in GILLES DELEUZE & FÉLIX GUATTARI, KAFKA: TOWARD A MINOR 
LITERATURE, at ix, xiv (Dana Polan trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1986) (1975). For Kafka was engaged, 
self-consciously, in the invention of a new kind of literature. 
Kafka does not read and admire Goethe and Flaubert to imitate them, much less to move 
beyond (aufheben) them according to some teleological schema like that of Hegel, but to 
determine and appreciate the incommensurable distance that separates him from their ideal 
of depth or perfection. Writing against the current and from a linguistic space that is radically 
heterogeneous with respect to his great predecessors, Kafka appears as the initiator of a new 
literary continent: a continent where reading and writing open up new perspectives, break 
ground for new avenues of thought, and, above all, wipe out the tracks of an old topography 
of mind and thought. 
Id. 
26. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 358. 
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Though nothing in “In der Strafkolonie” (or for that matter in Kafka’s other 
“legal” texts) supports the interpretation, says Minkkinen, Kafka is read as if he were 
engaged in a critique of modern jurisprudence that consisted in no more than simple 
reversal of its “basic systematics of hierarchy,” as if he were simply “spokesman for 
an anti-positivistic ‘ethics of justice.’”27 Kafka has become, in effect, the victim of 
massive interpretive overdetermination, of “prestructuring expectations created by 
the proper name and law of the Kafkaesque.”28 In the Kafkaesque, “labyrinthine 
legal institutions seem to function according to their own internal rules” and “law 
evades the well-meaning attempts of the man of reason to subject it to the rational 
dictates of Enlightenment thought”; it ceases to comply “with the procedural form 
of logical sequences.”29 In the Kafkaesque, law fundamentally disobeys the 
principles of modern jurisprudence. In a world of reversal, one might ask, what 
could more comfortingly express the restoration of justice than modern 
jurisprudence itself?30 
Most assuredly, that is not Kafka’s purpose. In what, then, does the 
jurisprudential “supplement” generated in Kafka’s minor literature, his minor 
jurisprudence, consist? What statement about modern law is to be found in “In der 
Strafkolonie” that is an opening not to critique’s reversals but to a new and 
foundational conception of law “as such,” of law’s “deep structures”?31 Kafka’s 
 
27. Id. at 350, 358. 
28. Id. Minkkinen invokes “the Kafkaesque” to refer to what one might term the “anticipation 
effect,” derived from interpretations of Kafka’s writing, that identifies Kafka with the “real life” of 
modernity, notably the nightmarish disorientation and helplessness that accompanies the relentless 
complexity of bureaucracy. Id. at 352. Minkkinen explains: 
A paradox is embodied in such a conception of literature and the law written with Kafka’s 
name. The text is read as a preset assortment of signs and structures of the world of the 
Kafkaesque while the reader merely recognizes something which was already dictated by the 
promises of the signature, by the law of the Kafkaesque. Kafka’s literature does not generate 
a world ex nihilo but merely verifies attributes of the world that precede the text. 
Id. The act of reading Kafka, then, becomes “a verification of the Kafkaesque assumption,” and Kafka 
becomes prophet. Id. 
29. Id. at 350. 
30. For as Minkkinen puts it, “In the critique of modern jurisprudence, the basic systematics of 
hierarchy may be reversed by, for example, subjecting positive law to the ethos of popular justice, but 
hierarchy in itself is rarely—if ever—questioned.” Id. 
31. Id. at 353. Describing the confrontation between contemporary critical legal scholarship and 
contemporary jurisprudence, Minkkinen refers to Goodrich’s “radical variant of critical legal studies” 
as a self-distancing “from the grand theories and the abstractness of modern jurisprudence.” 
MINKKINEN, supra note 10, at 10. Minkkinen continues: 
Goodrich’s radicalism rejects the descriptive theories of “law as such” and the programmatic 
political theories that envelop them; the “patronising dogmas of truth” must now make way 
for theories of the particular. Radical critique abandons the “uninteresting” questions of 
what law is—an ontological question—or how one can know about law—an epistemological 
question—but, partly restating what has just been denounced, takes up “the historical and 
ontological question of how law is lived, what are its habitual forms, what is its deep structure 
that allows its repetition in ever different forms”. The initial arguments of the debate 
emphasise, then, the issue of scientific relevance and interest. Goodrich’s dispute with the 
traditions is not merely about the essential characteristics of a particular entity, but also about 
how law should be studied. For my purposes here, it is only a matter of taste whether the 
object of the science of law is defined as “law as such” or as “deep structures”. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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yearning for truth, says Minkkinen, allows him “to unravel the essence of law and 
see the legal phenomenon as it truly is.” Through Nietzsche he arrives at a “Wesen 
[essence] of law” that is expressed “by way of negation in relation to the narrative, 
in another law.”32 The result, “contrary to the common interpretation,” is not an 
account of law as “an image of horror that demands justice through [its] negation.” 
Kafka’s account of law “is much more disquieting than that.”33 
First comes description, undertaken with all the “pedantic accuracy of the 
entomologist:” of the penal colony, of its law, and of law’s machinery—the mighty 
engine that executes law’s sentences: 
Physical punishment is a ‘mnemonics of pain’, a painful way of reminding 
forgetful man of her commitments and promises, of her social duties and 
responsibilities to the community. Nietzsche’s mnemonic technique is 
simple: the promise that one has broken is written on the skin of the 
criminal with fire because only that which causes ceaseless pain will be 
remembered. The community partakes in this literary torture but not 
through identification with the victim and the sensation of just revenge, 
but by experiencing pure pleasure in inflicting pain to another; punishment 
is a feast of cruelty.34 
Here is no allegory of modernity. When Kafka writes about suffering, says 
Minkkinen, “there is no room for metaphor or figuration but only literal truth. 
There is no als, no ‘as’ to mute the coupling of world and penitentiary: for Kafka, 
the world is a penal colony.”35 
Second, and more important, Minkkinen refers us to the literal truth of the 
law and justice to which the community’s festive cruelty has opened our eyes. “For 
Nietzsche, law as Gesetz is law which is posited and, hence, ‘positive’ law. Law exists 
only in as much as it conforms to validity (Geltung), and law is valid if the will (Wille) 
that has posited it has the power (Macht) to do so.”36 The rule of law of modern 
jurisprudence does not exist. Or rather, the actual relationship between law and rule 
of law is the inverse of that which modern jurisprudence posits. 
The rule of Law and justice are creations of the law-giver, creatures of law. 
The commanding activity of the highest power is positing laws, law-giving, 
the powerful manifestation of what is right (Recht) and what is wrong 
(Unrecht). According to Nietzsche, the right and the wrong can only exist 
through law-giving as posited laws . . . to talk of them as such would be 
senseless.37 
What, finally, of the law-giver? Where lies the foundation of the law-giver’s 
power to command, to posit laws? Not in any “transcendental requirement of 
 
32. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 358. On the salience of “another,” see MINKKINEN, supra note 
10, at 147–49, 166–67, 172–73, 177–82; id. at 160 (rewriting “another law” as “an other law”). 
33. MINKKINEN, supra note 10, at 152. 
34. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 352, 359. 
35. Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted). 
36. Id. at 359. 
37. Id. at 360. 
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justice”38 or rule of law but in will—will to truth (which was Kafka’s will) which is 
also will to power: 
As an expression of a commanding will, law is, for Nietzsche, the rule of 
Law or justice which justifies or condemns, and the just or unjust nature 
of any procedure is ultimately based on the positing of laws, not on the 
rule of Law. The power to command and to posit laws is, accordingly, the 
foundation of the rule of Law, of all conceptions of right and wrong.39 
To identify minor jurisprudence as an objective for the ongoing “Law As . . .” 
project is to embrace not a clarion intellectual program, but rather the prospect of 
plural invocations of what the description “minor jurisprudence” entails. Glossolalia, 
after all, suggests the attractiveness (and mystery) of speaking of law and justice in 
different tongues. We can note that in some respects the difference between the 
varieties embraced by Peter Goodrich and Panu Minkkinen seems slight. Each after 
all is “other” to the rule of law imagined by major jurisprudence, “as a conceptual 
construct the creation of which is regulated by the reason of modern science.”40 
Each invokes Nietzsche, and Deleuze and Guattari, as inspiration.41 Each 
recognizes that to attend to the history of legal science is necessarily (if not, in 
Minkkinen’s case, sufficiently) to attend to a history of power. Each is, to that 
extent, a critical jurisprudence that addresses law, whether “as such” or as “deep 
structure.” That said, their valences for the future of “Law As . . .” are clearly 
distinct—the one oppositional and antifoundational, the other initiatory and so, to 
that extent, foundational.42 To the extent that the legacy of post-structuralism has 
 
38. Id. at 361. 
39. Id. at 360. Hence, Minkkinen argues, the figure of the explorer, who appears in “In der 
Strafkolonie” to epitomize a (compromised) ethics of justice, in fact represents will to power, giver of 
law, philosopher “of the dangerous ‘Perhaps,’” no matter that—and in fact confirmed because—he 
flees his destiny. Id. at 361–62; see also DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 25, at 45. On the possibility 
of a Nietzschean minor jurisprudence, see Jonathan Yovel, Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean 
Jurisprudence, in NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY: HALF-WRITTEN LAWS 23 (Peter Goodrich & 
Mariana Valverde eds., 2005). 
40. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 350. 
41. Id. at 357–62; see also GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 2, 175–78; Peter Goodrich & Mariana 
Valverde, Introduction: Nietzsche’s Half-Written Laws, in NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY: HALF-
WRITTEN LAWS, supra note 39, at 1. 
42. Beyond this collection and works already cited, other examples of work invoking or 
examining “minor jurisprudence,” generally in Goodrich’s register, include Christine L. Green, The 
Tribunal de las Aguas: A Minor Jurisprudence, Not Jurisprudentially Minor, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 89 
(2008); Elena Loizidou, Sex @ the End of the Twentieth Century: Some Re-marks on a Minor Jurisprudence, 10 
LAW & CRITIQUE 71 (1999); Karin Van Marle, ‘We Exist, but Who are We?’ Feminism and the Power of 
Sociological Law, 20 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 149 (2012). But see also Olivia Barr, Walking with Empire, 
38 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 59 (2013), who situates her embrace of minor jurisprudence, explicitly in 
contrast both to Goodrich and to the tendencies associated here with Deleuze and Guattari, as one 
“that accepts the institution of common law” and attends to “the place of jurisdictional testimony in 
historical vignettes,” by which means “it becomes possible to attend to the substrate of how common 
law comes to be in place through technologies of jurisdiction.” Id. at 73. For commentary on the 
implications for jurisprudence of this third and distinct “minor” register, which they term “a critical 
jurisprudence of jurisdiction,” see SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & SHAUN MCVEIGH, JURISDICTION 20–29 
(2012). 
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been to trap the activity of critique in an endless loop, which leads to nothing other 
than more of itself, it is worth assessing whether, without sidestepping critique, 
“Law As . . .” can offer means both to benefit tangibly from it and to move through 
it, toward new foundational positions. 
In the remainder of this Introduction I offer my own assessment of the 
differing valences of these distinct invocations of minor jurisprudence by examining 
to what extent they are manifest in the articles that comprise this third iteration of 
“Law As . . .”. As in earlier collections, it is the articles themselves rather than any 
introductory gloss that demonstrate whether “Law As . . .” continues to be “not 
without its uses, its promises, its provocations.”43 But because the enterprise 
remains (as its signal ellipsis suggests) one in progress, underway, becoming, it may be 
of use to offer a provisional assessment of the direction of its jurisprudential turn. 
I do so by considering first matters of substance: What is the subject of this 
jurisprudence? Then, matters of means: How are its inquiries organized? And 
finally, outcomes: What are its goals? 
II. “BUCKET-LOADS OF EXTINGUISHMENT”44 
Although all the articles presented in this issue address matters of substance, 
the first three do so with particular attention to the intersection of the art of 
historical description and analysis with “the historical and ontological question of 
how law is lived, what are its habitual forms, what is its deep structure.”45 
In Colonialism and Constitutional Memory, Aziz Rana firmly attaches the history 
of the United States to that of worldwide Anglophone settler-colonialism, its 
“indescribable consanguinity of race,” and its commitments to white settler 
dominance, also known as enlightened “European civilization.”46 Rana also 
addresses the purposeful century-long “forgetting” of this history, once proudly 
acknowledged, such that “Today . . . to describe in mainstream public discussion 
the United States as part of an imperial family of settler societies would be deeply 
jarring.”47 How has memory of American settler-colonialism been extinguished? 
How has exceptionalist civic uniqueness, binding together “a nation of immigrants,” 
smothered awareness of a colonialist past? Rana points to a symbolism of the 
Constitution arising not at the Founding, but at that extraordinary moment more 
than a century later when the continental settlement frontier closed and, 
 
43. Tomlins & Comaroff, supra note 4, at 1079. 
44. Jodie Brough, Wik Draft Threat to Native Title, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 28, 1997, 
at 3 (quoting the Honourable Timothy Andrew Fischer, AC, GCPO (Companion of the Order of 
Australia; Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of Pius IX), Member of the Australian Parliament 
for Farrer, New South Wales (1984–2001), ninth Leader of the National Party of Australia (1990–1999), 
tenth Deputy Prime Minister of Australia (1996–1999), Australian Ambassador to the Holy See (2009–
2012)). 
45. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC 
MASKS 2 (1990). 
46. Aziz Rana, Colonialism and Constitutional Memory, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 263, 264–65 (2015). 
47. Id. at 266. 
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simultaneously, the United States became itself a transoceanic imperial power. The 
repurposing of the Constitution, he says, “reimagined the country in more inclusive 
terms” while providing “an ideological framework that allowed classically privileged 
American insiders to still preserve the basic institutional structures of the polity—
those of an increasingly completed settler project—while at the same time asserting 
greater authority abroad.”48 Twentieth-century America embraced its own 
postcoloniality—erased its own colonialism—but by discursive sleight of hand, its 
new civic consciousness amending none of the deep structure of embedded 
privilege that an honest rupture with past exploitation required. In place of “the 
type of sustained policies—such as those of reparations, land return, material 
redistribution, or respect for shared indigenous sovereignty—that marked 
decolonization efforts elsewhere,” those who had been the “historically excluded” 
of the United States were required to manifest “unconditional attachment to the 
nation, its central symbols at home, and its practices abroad,” and to accept as 
historical gospel the nation self-imagined as “a liberal society engaged in a process 
of self-fulfillment” before their exclusion might be ameliorated by a modicum of 
careful “reform.”49 
Leti Volpp’s The Indigenous As Alien also addresses U.S. history as a history of 
erasure, specifically erasure “of preexisting indigenous peoples”;50 that is, those of 
the “historically excluded” over whom the nineteenth-century flood tide of 
Anglophone settler-colonialism most fiercely rolled. The extinguishments she 
recounts are multiplicitous: Indians erased by the Westphalian territorial sovereign’s 
redefinition of prior indigenous space; Indians condemned to isolation in a 
“before” time, out of any current state of mind; Indians not taxed—that is, tribal 
Indians—repetitiously deported to a jurisdictional locale beyond the settled 
homeland, beyond polity and civic identity, there to be beaten into admissible shape 
by Teddy Roosevelt’s “mighty pulverizing engine”;51 Indians admitted only to be 
assimilated, dispersed, disappeared through a carefully-managed “intolerance of 
[their] difference”;52 Indians falling through the cracks of Michael Walzer’s sloppy 
account of immigration sovereignty, fetching up—when noticed—not as 
indigenous at all, but as alien;53 Indians as transborder aliens—“‘the real 
Americans . . . called aliens’”54—immobilized in their own blood, dying the slow 
 
48. Id. at 268. 
49. Id. at 266, 286. 
50. Leti Volpp, The Indigenous As Alien, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 289, 289 (2015). 
51. Id. at 303. 
52. Id. at 292. Or as Alain Badiou famously puts it, “Become like me and I will respect your 
difference.” ALAIN BADIOU, ETHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL 25 (Peter 
Hallward trans., Verso 2001) (1998). 
53. Volpp, supra note 50, at 299. Sloppy, because Walzer appears to draw no distinction between 
the situation of a settler polity confronting an indigenous population (as in the United States) and an 
indigenous population confronting a population forcibly introduced by a colonizer (as in the case of 
Asian indentured labor imported into British sub-Saharan Africa). In both cases the oppressed minority 
is “alien.” 
54. Id. at 314. 
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torturous death of waiting for naturalization; Indians—Locke’s natural men—
unnaturalizable by the polity whose settler compact extinguished their state of 
nature.55 
How to understand the substance of these dual histories of a polity that, as 
Volpp puts it (borrowing from Leila Kawar), “has been juridically formulated into 
a state with immigration problems rather than a state engaged in a project of 
conquest and settlement”?56 How to understand not just the substantive 
manifestations of erasure, but the theory and practice—the jurisprudence—of it? 
Stewart Motha’s Law, History, Ontology provides important clues.57 Concerned with 
the displacement of “the problem of justice,”58 Motha references political and 
historical debates arising from the High Court of Australia’s remarkable 1992 
decision in Mabo and others v Queensland (No. 2), which recognized, for the first time 
since European occupancy of the continent, a qualified concept of indigenous land 
title in Australian common law.59 Mabo’s qualification—that native title rights might 
be held to have been extinguished by governments manifesting a clear and plain and 
legal intention to do so—was tested in 1996 in Wik Peoples v Queensland, in which 
Justice John Toohey stated, for the Court majority, that a government grant of a 
pastoral lease did not amount to a grant of exclusive possession and therefore “was 
no necessary extinguishment” of a coexisting native title. Toohey also wrote that 
“[i]f inconsistency is held to exist between the rights and interests conferred by 
native title and the rights conferred under the statutory grants, those rights and 
interests must yield, to that extent, to the rights of the grantees.”60 The Australian 
federal government’s response to Wik was peremptory statutory action to protect 
pastoral leaseholders from native title claims.61 
 
55. Id. at 316–17. 
56. Id. at 316. 
57. Stewart Motha, As If—Law, History, Ontology, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 327 (2015). 
58. Id. at 337. 
59. According to Penny Pether, Mabo was “arguably the most potentially constitutionally radical, 
and almost certainly the most politically contentious decision of the Australian High Court in its 
history.” See Penny Pether, Principles or Skeletons? Mabo and the Discursive Constitution of the Australian 
Nation, 4 LAW TEXT CULTURE 115, 116 (1998). The salient features of Mabo are discussed in TONY 
BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY: 
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 154–63 (5th ed. 2010). 
60. Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 83 (Austl.) (Pastoral Leases case). As of 1993, a very 
large proportion of the land mass of Australia was subject to pastoral leases—38% of Western Australia, 
41% of New South Wales, 42% of South Australia, 51% of the Northern Territory, and 54% of 
Queensland. See Paul Keating, The 10-Point Plan that Undid the Good Done on Native Title, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, June 1, 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/the-
10point-plan-that-undid-the-good-done-on-native-title-20110531-1feec.html. 
61. Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) (Austl.). According to Maureen Tehan, 
The overall effect of the amendments was to significantly diminish the area of land and water 
over which native title might exist and the areas of land or water and the types of activities 
over which indigenous people have meaningful rights in relation to future uses. . . . The 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner argued that rather than 
building on the principle of shared land use and coexistence underpinning the Wik decision, 
the amendments not only amounted to a lost opportunity but were also ‘destructive of the 
most valuable resource . . . trust’. Indigenous people made it clear that they rejected the 
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Australian native title law is thus an archive of erasure, of erasure hesitantly 
undone—a corner of the historical veil lifted—and erasure redone, brutally, by the 
bucket load.62 It is also, necessarily, an archive of sovereignty: of Crown claims 
“built on the monstrous fiction that the native inhabitants were barbarians without 
a settled law,” followed by an indigenous counterclaim that burdens “the radical 
title of the Crown” and suggests the possibility of innovation (an opening “towards 
a future ‘post-colonial’ sovereignty and law”), followed by a peremptory closure—
reassertion of the Crown’s “monistic plenitude” in the form of comprehensive 
retrospective extinguishment.63 In all respects it is a case study of the 
consanguineous settler-colonialism to which both Rana and Volpp annex U.S. 
history. 
Motha also addresses history as an agency of minor jurisprudence. Australia’s 
“history wars” refer in general to the venomous response of right-wing historians, 
like Keith Windschuttle and Michael Connor, to the work of Henry Reynolds on 
the violent dispossession of Aboriginal Australians, and in particular to the reliance 
upon elements of Reynolds’ work by the High Court in Mabo.64 Motha calls our 
attention to a distinct and later skirmish turning on Ian Hunter’s critique of 
Reynolds’ subsequent attempts to ground an Aboriginal sovereignty right in the 
claim that in the law of nations prevailing at the time of colonization, “Aboriginal 
territorial self-governance was legally recognisable as sovereignty . . . such that the 
actions of the British and Australian states in denying Aboriginal sovereignty are 
morally or legally ‘justiciable’ under the jus gentium.”65 Hunter terms Reynolds’ 
attempt “a history of the moral nation’s originary fall into injustice”66—in other 
words an attempt to counter “the forceful functioning of law in modernity” with a 
redemptive “ethics of justice”67—to which Hunter responds with an 
 
amendments and that they were not consulted nor did they consent to the Act. It was clear 
that native title was a subordinate right. This appeared to conflict with the requirement of 
non-discrimination and the goal of substantive equality . . . . 
Maureen Tehan, A Hope Disillusioned, An Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common Law Native Title and Ten 
Years of the Native Title Act, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 523, 555–56 (2003) (second ellipsis in original) 
(citations omitted). Aboriginal activist Mick Dodson said at the time: 
By purporting to “confirm” extinguishment by inconsistent grants, the Commonwealth is 
purposely pre-empting the development of the common law—not allowing sufficient time 
to integrate the belated recognition of native title into Australia’s land management system. 
This does not require the obliteration of indigenous interests so as to favour non-indigenous 
interests. 
Keating, supra note 60. 
62. See Brough, supra note 44, at 3. 
63. Motha, supra note 57, at 330, 331. 
64. See, e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND (1987); Andrew Fitzmaurice, The 
Great Australian History Wars, UNIV. OF SYDNEY, Mar. 15, 2006, http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html
?newsstoryid=948. 
65. Ian Hunter, Natural Law, Historiography, and Aboriginal Sovereignty, 11 LEGAL HIST. 137, 142 
(2007); see also HENRY REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS ON RACE, STATE, 
AND NATION (1996). 
66. Hunter, supra note 65, at 141. 
67. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 358. For the implications of Reynolds’ position, see supra notes 
27–30 and accompanying text. 
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antimetaphysical contextualist-historicist analysis that comprehensively undermines 
the legal basis of Reynolds’ argument. For Hunter, “contextualist historiography of 
political thought and public law constitutionalism views the state not as an agent 
responsible to and for the moral history of the nation, but as one whose normatively 
ungoverned actions—including colonisation—give rise to history as their 
uncontrollable consequence.”68 
There is foundation, however, in Hunter’s antifoundationalism. Hunter’s 
normatively ungoverned state giving rise to law and history counterposes power to 
command—will to power—to Reynolds’ ethics of justice. That is, his conclusion 
implies a Nietzschean minor jurisprudence, one that we can extend to encompass 
Rana’s and Volpp’s accounts of the consequences of U.S. settler-colonialism, one 
that, if genuinely Nietzschean, can fashion an opening to an other law.69 And as 
Motha points out, even taken on his own terms Hunter has not in fact fully 
succeeded in discarding metaphysics. Though its actions are normatively 
ungoverned, “as if” remains the state’s essence. “The fictional assertions of the 
sovereign remain inchoate. The imagery and symbolism of sovereignty assert a unity 
that is nowhere to be found.”70 Motha’s purpose, his historical ontology of an 
endlessly iterated “as if,” is to make that metaphysics plain.71 
III. SCATTERGORIES72 
Tentatively, then, we can identify concealment and erasure, the means of their 
effectuation, and attempts not simply to criticize but to depart from them, as 
subjects for “Law As . . .” as a minor historical jurisprudence. We turn now to how 
inquiry might be organized. Three essays offer an array of possibilities, each 
constituting a contemporary form of disciplined inquiry, or prudence. 
In Speaking Imperfectly: Law, Language, and History, Marianne Constable calls to 
 
68. Hunter, supra note 65, at 167. 
69. MINKKINEN, supra note 10, at 160. See generally supra notes 23–39 and accompanying text. 
70. Motha, supra note 57, at 342. Olivia Barr writes of the 
imagined slide from the law of England to the law of the territory evok[ing] a very familiar 
image of legal place; one of sovereign authority as an image of law attaching to land, 
translating today as a common law imagining of a landmass covered by Anglo-Australian 
common law. This is an image and representation of place, both then and now, of singular 
common law fullness; of one empty space filled with and only with common law; no gaps, 
complete, exclusive, everywhere; a non-textured, evenly distributed, perfectly well-buttered 
smothering of law across land. 
Barr, supra note 42, at 61. But 
it is through practices of movement in both space and time that common law comes to rest 
in place. Holding questions of movement and place to law through the practice of a minor 
jurisprudence . . . it becomes possible to attend to the substrate of how common law comes 
to be in place through technologies of jurisdiction: tacitly, hesitantly, incompletely. Paying 
attention to movement and its remnant remains, therefore, offers a way of accounting for 
different textures of legal place. 
Id. at 73. 
71. Motha, supra note 57, at 328. 
72. “Scattergories” is a creative-thinking category-based game first produced by Hasbro in 1988. 
Players score points by nominating objects within a set of categories, given an initial letter, within a time 
limit. Scattergories, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scattergories (last visited Dec. 17, 2014). 
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our attention an important contrast between sociolegal and humanistic modes of 
inquiry into law and legal studies. In Constable’s account, the sociolegal mode 
associates law with causality and the expression of interest. The sources and 
methods of study it embraces are selected in accordance with their capacity to 
elucidate how law functions as an index of power and control. The humanistic mode 
attends to law as language. It investigates how the sources we use come to be 
produced and identified as such, how events gain (or do not gain) recognition as 
“legal.” To treat law as language—Constable’s preference—is to treat it as 
“imperfect,” that is, “incomplete, ongoing, continuous, routine, habitual, or 
interruptible action or activity, in the context of which other acts or events occur.”73 
It is to attend to activity being undertaken, to “the ways that legal acts appear against 
and disappear into the background of practices that authorize them.”74 
Constable provides two vignettes of humanistic legal history in action—her 
well-known study of the English mixed jury,75 and current research on a 
phenomenon that became known as “the new unwritten law” in later nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Chicago—the exoneration of women who killed their 
husbands. Each illustrates Constable’s career-long critical encounter with positive 
law. The mixed jury was in its early medieval origin, a register of the importance of 
locality. Its history—one of transformative redefinition and eventual 
disappearance—is a microcosm of the history of the rise of positive law, “the 
emergence of a world in which customary law gives way and the law of officials 
assumes exclusive standing as law, in which the territorial jurisdiction of a state 
replaces the principle of personality of law (that one lives and is judged according 
to one’s own law), in which social science transforms the practices of a people into 
propositional knowledge of norms, and in which law becomes an instrument of 
social policy directed toward the management of a population.”76 It is a history of 
the decline of law as collective practice and its emergence instead as a device—a 
mechanism—the authority of which is derived from “sources external to it, whether 
in writings . . . or in an effectivity of force or will that histories of positive law figure 
as conquest.”77 The new unwritten law refers to a practice of exception from 
positive law and the development of an awareness of that practice. Constable asks 
descriptive questions: When did it begin? When and how did it end? Description 
offers an opportunity to shake up the categories, to estrange the routine. Like the 
mixed jury, the story of the new unwritten law “highlights the development of facets 
of law that many now take for granted: the legitimacy and authority of writings as 
sources of law and history; conventions of testifying to and documenting truth and 
reality; and the privileged ability of empirical and social sciences to access, observe 
 
73. Marianne Constable, Speaking Imperfectly: Law, Language, and History, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
349, 354 (2015). 
74. Id. at 354. 
75. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING 
CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994). 
76. Constable, supra note 73, at 351. 
77. Id. at 357. 
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and know law.”78 Law as language opens a history closed by social science to 
Motha’s “narratives, fictions, and images,” to “the imaginary.”79 
Each of Constable’s vignettes can be appropriated for the category of minor 
jurisprudence. Each hence offers a case study in how “Law As . . .” can pursue a 
jurisprudential turn. The course each vignette follows seems most readily to 
conform to minor jurisprudence in Peter Goodrich’s sense—knowledge and 
practices “denied or ignored,” “discarded or failed,” “repressed or absorbed.”80 Yet 
Constable’s humanistic mode intends to treat law as open rather than closed, 
dynamic rather than static, uncertain rather than conclusive as a means to lay 
claims—“assert truth and demand recognition”81—rather than simply to dominate. 
In that sense, her work also engages Minkkinen’s conception of minor jurisprudence 
as a “statement about law” that can be “the foundation of a new law.”82 
Bernadette Meyler’s Law, Literature, and History: The Love Triangle remains 
situated at the intersection of law and the humanities, where she offers a mode of 
inquiry distinct in appearance from Constable’s emphasis on law as language, but in 
fact quite compatible. Here too we can detect a means whereby humanistic inquiry 
can produce minor jurisprudence, in Meyler’s case expressed in the form of 
pedagogical practice. 
Meyler finds “possibilities for new births of knowledge”83 in her love triangle, 
but currently an uneven relationship among its components. Both literature and 
history have strong links with law, but less so with each other. The weakness of this 
link is symptomatic of tensions over disciplinary authority and the acceptance of 
law’s normativity. Legal historians (as Constable also suggests) are decidedly 
ambivalent about law’s normativity, but despite this the legal academy deems their 
expertise essential to legal inquiry. Scholars of law and literature are completely open 
to normative inquiry and indeed chastise legal historians for their pretensions to 
“descriptive rigor that can be separated from normative claims.”84 Yet on the whole 
they enjoy much less authority than historians in the legal academy. Meyler notes 
the development in recent years of greater openness in legal history to what Steven 
Wilf has termed “thick normativity,”85 yet she does not pin her hopes to the 
emergence of a law-literature-history “interdiscipline.”86 To the contrary “[i]t may 
 
78. Id. at 361. 
79. Motha, supra note 57, at 337. 
80. GOODRICH, supra note 12, at 3. 
81. Constable, supra note 73, at 353. 
82. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 358. 
83. Bernadette Meyler, Law, Literature, and History: The Love Triangle, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 365, 
366 (2015). 
84. Id. at 375. 
85. Id. at 377; see also Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 543, 562 (2011). 
86. This was the term Penny Pether began using in the mid-1990s to describe the ideal 
relationship between law and literature. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Jangling the Keys to the Kingdom: Some 
Reflections on The Crucible, on an American Constitutional Paradox, and on Australian Judicial Review, 8 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 317 (1996). Until her untimely death in September 2013, Penny 
Pether was one of the most productive of law and literature scholars actively engaged in historical 
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be th[e] very cognizance of disciplinarity that enables the passion for other 
disciplines to arise.”87 Hence Meyler recommends “a pedagogy that temporarily 
situates students entirely within the technical aspects of the local discipline.”88 By 
foregrounding “law” independent of explanatory “context,” students “became 
aware of law as a discipline while simultaneously witnessing the distinctions law 
draws to render itself independent of its environment.”89 By “entering into the 
consciousness” of law presented to them deliberately as “a particular field,” Meyler 
reports that students developed for themselves in the search for understanding “a 
desire for another discipline that follows not a path of assimilation or escape but 
rather one of embrace.”90 Students, in effect, take the path of minor jurisprudence 
themselves by “inhabiting [the] contingency” of legal materials firsthand.91 
The final essay in this group is David Caudill’s Law, Science, and the Economy: 
One Domain? A case study of financial bias in scientific expertise, Caudill’s essay at 
first sight seems to offer quite a marked contrast to Meyler’s love triangle. In place 
of her endorsement of disciplinary difference, the “one domain” of his title 
announces dissolution of distinctions among the essay’s three components. 
Scientific expertise is a “coproduction” of the three enterprises of law, science, and 
the economy.92 Because each enterprise is as rhetorical, social, institutional, political, 
and historical as the next, no priority or privilege can distinguish amongst them. 
Instead they collapse into each other: “economy is already in science . . . science is 
already in law . . . law is already in [ ] economy.”93 Where Meyler takes her cue from 
Niklas Luhmann’s autopoietic systems theory, which proposes that the subsystems 
of a social system are operatively closed to each other, Caudill’s language of 
coproduction invokes Bruno Latour’s suspicion of categories and divisions, his 
emphasis on hybridity.94 
As Caudill proceeds, however, the contrast becomes much less marked. 
Luhmann’s social subsystems are “cognitively open” to each other. Latourian 
coproduction does not imagine law, science, and economy as the same thing, one 
and indivisible; rather—as actor-network theory suggests—as differentiated but 
 
research on law. She also conceived of her work as an active engagement in the production of minor 
jurisprudence, specifically in the form of epics of constitutionalism, in the definition of which she always 
referred to Peter Goodrich, yet advanced in such a way as to retain “the practicing lawyer’s visceral 
commitment to the faith that the practices of the rule of law . . . can matter in ways that challenge 
injustice tangibly.” See Penelope Pether, The Prose and the Passion, 66 MEANJIN 43 (2007); Penelope 
Pether, “Free at Last”? Epilogues, Aftermaths, and Plotting the Nation, 24 LAW & LITERATURE 102, at 107–
08 (2012) (book review). Had her life not been interrupted, Penny Pether would have been a participant 
in “Law As . . .” III. 
87. Meyler, supra note 83, at 383. 
88. Id. at 378. 
89. Id. at 383. 
90. Id. at 378. 
91. Id. at 382. 
92. David S. Caudill, Law, Science, and the Economy: One Domain?, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 393, 395 
(2015). 
93. Id. at 394. 
94. Id. at 396; Meyler, supra note 83, at 378. 
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densely interrelated and interpenetrating. The question in both cases is the form of 
interaction. To what extent do Luhmann’s recursive subsystems and Latour’s 
networked actors imply qualitatively different outcomes? 
For our purposes, in understanding how to organize inquiry that can produce 
a minor jurisprudence, the key really lies in Caudill’s conclusion: the goal should be 
that “of description in advance of critique, of groundwork, of trying to understand 
how given or conventional categories and distinctions” might obscure features of 
the object under contemplation.95 One treats received categories with suspicion, but 
one does so “‘because they divide up a cloth that we want seamless in order to study 
it as we choose.’”96 Caudill’s study highlights the way critique based on an existing 
categorization of objects can be simply ineffective.97 To reject received distinctions, 
or ways of doing things, is not to reject distinction or categorization as such. Rather, 
it is to create space for new approaches. 
IV. “WHAT ROUGH BEAST . . . ?”98 
David Caudill’s emphasis on description and groundwork, on careful 
examination of received categories, serves as a fitting segue to the three essays that 
conclude this issue, and that, in doing so, provide samples of what “Law As . . .” 
may in future look like as a minor jurisprudence in action, as conduct. 
In History, Law, and Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the History 
of Law, Constantin Fasolt engages in a form of intellectual ridurre ai principii that seeks 
to persuade historians of the impossibility of writing the history of law without 
writing the history of justice. The categories cannot be separated. “Law and justice 
are thoroughly intertwined.”99 In effect, Fasolt is engaged in the same critique 
launched by Stewart Motha (and echoed by Marianne Constable and Bernadette 
Meyler) of a historiography “incapable of providing a normative response,” unable 
to imagine a position “apart from the contextual and contingent forces on the 
ground . . . a historiography with no place for justice.”100 His approach is singular. 
It is to demonstrate that, as a matter of language and logic, and of etymology, “the 
distinction between facts (of law) and opinions (about justice) hides the truth about 
the relationship between history, law, and justice . . . that without justice there is no 
history of law.”101 
The demonstration has two parts. First, Fasolt carefully describes Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical arguments for the position that, for human beings to 
communicate in language they must agree both in definitions and in judgments. 
 
95. Caudill, supra note 92, at 410 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 411 (emphasis added) (quoting BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION 223 (1987)). 
97. Id. at 398. 
98. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1919). 
99. Constantin Fasolt, History, Law, and Justice: Empirical Method and Conceptual Confusion in the 
History of Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413, 417 (2015). 
100. Motha, supra note 57, at 336–37. 
101. Fasolt, supra note 99, at 419. 
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Adopting that position for himself on the grounds that the arguments he has 
described are sound, Fasolt applies it to the intertwinement of law and justice: 
Their intertwinement consists of the very combination of agreement in 
definitions with agreement in judgments that is required for 
communication in any case, except that in this case the communication 
does not lie in the realm of theory but in the realm of practice, and that it 
does not result in statements of fact, but statements of what we ought to 
do (or ought not to do) because we know that it is right (or wrong).102 
Note that, like Caudill, Fasolt is not saying that law and justice are one and the same, 
or that the one can be derived from the other. Law and justice “differ as deeply 
from each other as having rules differs from following rules, meaning from 
understanding, and thinking from acting . . . Law embodies our agreement in 
definitions of what we ought to do, and justice embodies our agreement in 
judgments of what that is.”103 But they are, in effect, codependent. 
[W]ithout justice we cannot make the law stick to reality. There would be 
nothing for law to say. And without law, justice would be random. That is, 
there would be no justice at all. That constitutes their intertwinement. It 
gives us the language we need in order to refer to practical reality: the reality 
that we intend to turn into actual reality because we judge it to be good.104 
The second part of Fasolt’s account creates a sure philosophical foundation 
for the historicality of justice—a necessary condition for the possibility of a 
historical minor jurisprudence that would make justice an object of contemplation. 
Against the tendency of historicist critique to treat invocations of justice as 
ahistorical moves beyond history to timelessness,105 Fasolt’s Wittgensteinian 
argument establishes that law and justice “do not exist in some Platonic heaven. 
They consist of agreements in judgments and definitions of what is right and wrong 
that are specific to specific communities of human beings at specific times and 
places.”106 He elaborates: 
As agreement in language must not be confused with the existence of a 
universal language, so agreement in ethics must not be confused with the 
existence of a universal moral code. Agreement in ethics rather means that 
there is no such thing as an agreement in judgments and definitions of 
what is right and wrong that none of us can join, and nothing someone can 
do that no one else can judge, no matter how deeply we may differ in our 
particular forms of morality, and no matter how alien a different culture 
may seem to us at first. All of us know the difference between right and 
wrong. In that regard we are agreed in ethics. But agreement in ethics does 
not mean that all of us make the same judgments and definitions of what is 
 
102. Id. at 443. 
103. Id.  
104. Id.  
105. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 65, at 137–40. 
106. Fasolt, supra note 99, at 449. 
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right and wrong. In that regard we differ from place to place and time to 
time.107 
But this does not commit Fasolt to a relativist history, or relativist 
jurisprudence, that desires simply to reconstruct the nature of past agreements, 
knowing that they will likely be different from those of the present. “Knowing what 
those agreements were means being able to figure out what those past people thought 
they were saying and doing. But it does not amount to writing history. In order to 
write history, we need to say what they were saying and doing.”108 The difference is 
that between using the criteria that governed past agreements to tell what happened 
in the past, and using our own. To write history we must use our own criteria: 
There is no way for us to say what they were doing unless we commit 
ourselves to the criteria on which the meaning of our words depends. This 
is a political commitment. Reducing history entirely to understanding the 
people of the past means making no commitment to any political 
community. That makes the truth about the past impossible to tell.109  
Fasolt’s history judges. It takes sides, and takes responsibility for the side it takes. 
That makes it minor historical jurisprudence in action. 
The second essay of this final group, Bonnie Honig’s The Laws of the Sabbath 
(Poetry): Arendt, Heine, and the Politics of Debt, offers a different example of minor 
jurisprudence in action. Taking as her point of departure the conference’s 
invocation of glossolalia, Honig’s interest (like other authors) is in what appears 
following the suspension of “normal rules or experience of signification.”110 
Arguing from the example of Heinrich Heine’s poem “Princess Sabbath,” her 
answer is what she terms “the Sabbath-power.”111 Heine writes of Sabbatarian 
metamorphosis “in which the lowest Jewish man becomes a king in his house once 
a week as he welcomes the Sabbath bride. ‘Of a prince by fate thus treated /Is my 
song. His name is Israel, /And a witch’s spell has changed him /To the likeness of 
a dog’”—or to be precise, Honig adds, “A ‘dog, with dog’s ideas’” —“But on every 
Friday evening, /On a sudden, in the twilight, /The enchantment weakens, ceases, 
/And the dog once more is human.”112 Honig’s analysis of the poem, and of 
Hannah Arendt’s reaction to it (and to Heine himself) leads her to the important 
argument that Sabbath-power is not so much a transformation of the quotidien—
the creation of a state of exception to the everyday that is an opening to the sacred—
as it an intensification of the secular that is achieved by human agency with the 
assistance of ritual practices and objects that enable us to realize the suspension of 
 
107. Id. at 449. 
108. Id. at 458. 
109. Id. (emphasis added). 
110. Bonnie Honig, The Laws of the Sabbath (Poetry): Arendt, Heine, and the Politics of Debt, 5 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 463, 463 (2015). 
111. Id. at 468. 
112. Id. at 469. 
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normality. “Thing and fantasy work together to produce the bundle of resilience 
and agency that I am here calling Sabbath-power.”113 
Honig adds three crucial observations. First, Sabbath-power “is not just an 
arcane name for a dated idea.”114 She cites several examples, among them “Strike 
Debt,” the debt resistance movement that buys debt and abolishes it using the 
language of “Rolling Jubilee.”115 A more distant (because currently less achievable) 
example is the syndicalist General Strike—a radical intensification and acceleration 
of (normal) suspension of work into revolutionary mass action.116 The examples 
underscore Sabbath-power’s generative nature. 
Second, Honig distinguishes her invocation of Sabbath-power from Giorgio 
Agamben’s claim of the Sabbath as template for his version of “destituent power,” 
the power of inoperativity, of cessation.117 Agamben’s destituent power is passive. 
It ignores “the collective and sensorial powers we exercise to make Sabbath . . . and, 
later, unmake it or bid it goodbye.”118 
Finally, Honig notes Sabbath-power’s limitations. “Sabbath-power, rights 
claiming, and more are the destituent forms of action available to those lacking, for 
the moment, access to constituent power. They may even serve as preliminaries to 
it, or necessary conditions of it. But they are not its substitutes.”119 
In both Fasolt’s case and Honig’s, the semblance of Minkkinen’s variety of 
minor jurisprudence seems obvious, though not developed as such (this is, after all, 
my construal of their work, not theirs). Neither is, per se, a jurisprudence of critique. 
Each rather creates the foundation for a transition toward something new, a 
prospect for innovation, a new law. Drawing on the work of Stanley Cavell, Fasolt, 
for example, concludes that “Writing history means making claims to community 
with the past.”120 If we take “claims making” here to mean, as Constable has it, the 
assertion of truth and demand for recognition, the activity of writing history that 
Fasolt describes is one that seeks in community with the past a foundation for one’s 
assertions of truth about the past and a demand for their recognition. The agentive 
presence of the historian is clear: “It is not only a matter of evidence and chronology 
but also of judging where our agreements with the dead come to an end . . . [of] 
making a commitment to a particular political community by settling disagreements 
 
113. Id. at 473. It is worth noting that Kafka’s In der Strafkolonie portrays the Condemned—“a 
‘stupid-looking wide-mouthed creature with bewildered hair and face’”—as a submissive dog, 
eventually raised (intensified) by the agency of the machine to a condition of enlightenment—“the 
‘radiance of justice.’” See Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 358–59. 
114. Honig, supra note 110, at 473. 
115. Id. at 474; see also You Are Not a Loan, STRIKE DEBT!, http://strikedebt.org/#initiatives 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2014). 
116. Honig, supra note 110, at 477. 
117. Id. at 477; see also Giorgio Agamben, What Is a Destituent Power?, 32 ENV’T & PLAN. D: 
SOC’Y & SPACE 65 (2014). 
118. Honig, supra note 110, at 479. 
119. Id. at 482. 
120. Fasolt, supra note 99, at 461 (referencing STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: 
WITTGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY, 20 (reprt. ed. 1999)). 
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with the dead,”121 and, one might add, settling disagreements with the living on 
behalf of the dead. Honig’s jurisprudence, likewise, sees in Sabbath-power’s 
intensification of the everyday the foundational “bundle of resilience and agency” 
that facilitates transition to a new law—a law of jubilee, destituent power become 
constituent. 
Though Minkkinen’s brand of minor jurisprudence may be implicit rather than 
explicit in the essays by Fasolt and Honig, the same cannot be said of the last essay 
in this group, and the last in the collection, William MacNeil’s From Rites to Realities 
(And Back Again): The Spectacle of Human Rights in The Hunger Games. MacNeil 
explicitly embraces The Hunger Games “as lex populi, as a legal fiction, [that] may very 
well hold out, in the fashion of what Panu Minkkinen would call a ‘minor 
jurisprudence,’ the prospect of a way forward” to a new law—in this case a new 
instantiation of human rights.122 Like Honig in dialog, in his case with Hilary 
Charlesworth and Suzanne Collins rather than Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Heine, 
MacNeil constructs from his interlocutors’ work a wondrous constellation—a 
dialectical image—that presents The Hunger Games as both allegory for the history of 
rights, and “theatricalisation of [the] nomological reality” that is the United Nations’ 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of its member-states compliance with human 
rights norms.123 Chartered in Panem’s own basic law, the Hunger Games stage for 
mass consumption and education an artificial state of nature—a Hobbesian “war 
of all against all”—in which none must leave her blocks before the starting gun 
under the state’s penalty of death, in which all then exercise their originary rights 
“to kill and be killed.”124 The Games stage the (Lockean) accumulation of property 
out of nature, resultant claims to rights of possession, and the conflicts provoked 
by the radical inequalities that accompany accumulation.125 They stage the social 
contract—the shifting alliances formed to serve temporary mutual advantage, 
protect and mobilize accumulated resources, and establish (in the short term) 
security for those allied.126 In their rapidly shifting environment and rules the Games 
even stage historicism’s complexity and contingency—“indeterminacy located in 
contradiction.”127 But just as Kafka, in Minkkinen’s telling, arrives at a “Wesen 
[essence] of law” that is expressed “by way of negation in relation to the narrative, 
in another law,”128 so the Hunger Games’ parodic rule of law—which MacNeil likens 
to what the critical legal Charlesworth would once have recognized, instantly, as 
law’s reality129—becomes the negative basis for a Honig-like intensification of its 
everyday spectacle of cruelty into another law, brought about by the (destituent) 
 
121. Id. at 461–62. 
122. MacNeil, supra note 23, at 485. 
123. Id. at 487. 
124. Id. at 492 
125. Id.  
126. Id.  
127. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, supra note 22, at 114. 
128. Minkkinen, supra note 14, at 358. 
129. MacNeil, supra note 23, at 498. 
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agency of Katniss and Peeta’s suicide pact,130 but manifested in the constitutive 
“pure love” of Katniss and Rue, the narrative pivot—carrying “the possibility and 
potential to mobilise its witnesses, energising them to action, functioning as a call 
to arms” —upon which Collins’ entire trilogy turns.131 
How, though, does the allegory fit the nomological reality of the UPR? It too 
is a theatricalisation—its rituals of sympathetic review mask a reality of ugly 
conflict132—that MacNeil suggests could turn via intensification (more rather than 
less ritual) into a new law: “the right to be left alone to reinvent the world.”133 For 
“the underlying presumption of the UPR is . . . that all nations, as signatories, aspire 
to be rights-oriented and, at least, have the best of intentions to act in accordance 
with international norms.”134 Human rights might be better served, says MacNeil, 
by more ritual of review informed by that presumption rather than by mutual 
condemnation of each other’s shortcomings.135 
CONCLUSION: “NOW SHOWN THEN TO HAVE BEEN FALSE” 
By now, more than enough has been said here to recommend the minor 
jurisprudential potential of the essays gathered in this collection. I encourage the 
reader to engage with them and, in engaging, develop new understandings of them 
to add to (or detract from) those I have imposed. 
What remains, very briefly, is to probe the nature of the “historical” in this 
minor jurisprudence. 
There is enough here, I think, to underline a “historical” that is not historicist. 
As Stewart Motha puts it, if legal history “is not amenable to a redemptive account,” 
neither is it “to a contextual account untroubled by contemporary ethical and 
political demands.”136 We find in Constantin Fasolt’s exacting philosophical 
argumentation a strong basis for that turn to the use of our own criteria.137 
These are arguments for a particular kind of “historical,” but do we have an 
example of a historical practice that fits our desire for this kind of historical 
jurisprudence? Walter Benjamin’s distinctly metaphysical historical materialism 
articulates the past at the moment of its recognizability, which is the here-and-
 
130. Id. at 495. 
131. Id. at 496. Arguably, however, MacNeil parts company from Honig over the rescue of 
constituent power from Agamben’s critique, given his citation of Jacques Lacan’s response to 
revolution. See id. at 497; Honig, supra note 110, at 477–79. 
132. MacNeil, supra note 23, at 487–88. 
133. Id. at 498. 
134. Id. at 487. 
135. One can also observe, with Minkkinen, that although “Occidental anti-racist critique 
considers the universal recognition of human rights as a victory of the other race . . . . [I]t is, of course, 
an Occidental triumph: the entire world has recognized the universality of Western values.” The right 
to be left alone, hence, becomes the best means for the West to “rediscover the other, the alterity of 
the radically different.” MINKKINEN, supra note 10, at 149. 
136. Motha, supra note 57, at 348. 
137. Fasolt, supra note 99, at 456. 
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now.138 Justice William Gummow’s summation of the meaning of Mabo—“that the 
long understood refusal in Australia to accommodate within the common law 
concepts of native title rested upon past assumptions of historical fact, now shown 
then to have been false”—may be read as an involuntary acknowledgement of precisely 
this philosophy of history.139 If we understand history to promise to enliven our 
understanding of an object (such as law) that we contemplate, we must recognize 
that the contemplated object is not enlivened by the relationalities within which it 
allegedly belongs, the relationalities of its time, but by the fold of time that creates 
it in constellation with the present, the moment of its recognition.140 In the 
dialectical image created by that fold we make our claim to community with the 
past, and on its foundation we turn to settle our agreements and disagreements, 
both with the dead and the living. 
  
 
138. Christopher Tomlins, Toward a Materialist Jurisprudence, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. 
HORWITZ 196, 211 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010). 
139. Motha, supra note 57, at 332 (quoting Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 180 
(Austl.) (Gummow, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). 
140. Tomlins, supra note 138, at 203; see also Christopher Tomlins, Historicism and Materiality in 
Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: A NEGLECTED DIALOGUE (Maksymilian Del 
Mar & Michael Lobban eds., forthcoming 2015). 
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